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Abstract
In many countries substance abuse is a social epidemic. This paper deals conceptually
with some macroeconomic aspects of widespread substance abuse with special
reference to narcotic drugs. The labour force is divided into non-using and therefore
fully productive workers, a number of whom are employed by the government in
drug-use prevention, and only partially productive drug users. An efficient
management of the nation’s portfolio of workers is taken to be the trajectory of drugprevention that maximises the present value of the stream of the disposable national
incomes.
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1. Introduction
Many studies have attempted to analyse conceptually the mechanics of either
individual decision making of addicts or of the market for a particular addictive
substance. This study attempts to analyse conceptually the effects of the spread of
substance abuse on aggregate economic variables and growth within a dynamic
optimisation framework and with special reference to narcotic drugs.
One hundred years ago almost all drugs were freely available in many
countries. However, since that time, progressively tougher restrictions have been
introduced on the traffic and consumption of many substances, and particularly mind
altering drugs such as narcotics. These restrictions have on many instances been the
outcome of significant international co-operation. For instance, the Hague Convention
post WWI limited the use of opium, morphine and heroin to medicinal purposes only,
with the Geneva Convention on 1925 adding cannabis to the list. In 1953 the World
Health Organisation recommended that the use of heroin for medicinal purposes be
banned. The Single Convention on narcotic drugs in 1961 consolidated the numerous
earlier agreements, while the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971
introduced controls on amphetamines, hallucinogens, barbiturates and some
tranquillisers. Finally, the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances was introduced in 1981. It prescribed measures against the
drug trade that included the confiscation of assets of those so convicted. During this
period individual countries have also introduced a myriad of domestic measures
against trade and consumption of narcotics and other drugs.
Given this brief history one could justifiably ask what has been the return on
this increasing worldwide investment in drug prohibition and control? Unfortunately
and perhaps perversely, the international efforts against drugs and the worldwide level
of drug use have escalated simultaneously. Arguably, the trade in and consumption of
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illicit drugs is one of the most serious social problems confronting governments in
many countries today. Perhaps in no other country is this most starkly the case than in
Colombia. For instance, according to Thoumi (2002), “The drug industry has acted as
a catalyst that accelerated a process of ‘delegitimation of the regime’, that has
…produced a sharp decline in trust that increased transaction costs, contributed to
increased violence and impunity, that has induced ‘free’ capital flight and larger
security costs, promoted expectations of very fast wealth accumulation that produced
highly speculative investments and increased bankruptcies, embezzlements and so
forth… Increased criminality has (resulted in) lost growth (exceeding) two
(percentage points) per year, without including its longer term effects on factor
productivity and capital formation” (pp.110-111, parentheses ours). The trade and
consumption of illicit drugs has had deleterious effects in other countries also such as
Mexico (see Chabet 2002) and Nigeria (see Klein 1999).
A number of individual country studies have attempted to quantify these social
costs with the estimates typically running to the hundreds of millions or billions of
dollars annually. For instance, Cartwright (1999), reports on a study jointly published
by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) and the National Institute on
Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse (NIAAA) that estimates that the cost for the USA in
1995 as US$110 billion. Whilst this estimate includes the costs of alcohol abuse, it is
clear that the illicit drug industry, even if the junior partner, nevertheless generates
massive social costs in the USA. Xie et. al. (1998) investigate the economic costs of
illicit drug use in Ontario, Canada, using a cost-of-illness approach and estimate that
cost as C$489 million in 1992. Finally, Cleeland et. al. (1988) estimated the direct
annual cost of drug law enforcement in Australia at A$123 million. This excludes the
social cost of the illicit drug industry in that country. One gets an idea of the likely
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magnitude of the industry worldwide from a 1998 United Nations report that
concluded it to be worth 400 billion dollars annually, beaten into second place only by
the international arms trade estimated to be worth US$800 billion annually (see Allen
1999, p.5). In some less developed countries, daily use of drugs (relatively mild in the
case of Yemen) has been an integral part of the local culture and has considerably
affected the households and aggregate time allocation, supply of labour, income,
consumption and investment. Notable examples are Yemen, where the addiction to a
relatively mild drug called Kat has been common, and Cambodia where there has
been a widespread use of opium, and where the economy of, and political affairs in, a
part of the country has been dominated by the production and supply of this drug.
Some researchers have concluded that the costs of drug use may actually have
been increased over time by the increasingly tougher worldwide prohibition on
narcotics and other drugs. For example, Miron (2001) argues that tougher drug law
enforcement simply results in higher rates of violence and criminal activity that
subsequently adds to the social costs to be borne by society. Kennally (2001) argues
that the prohibition restricts entry, reduces consumer information and thus increases
the market power of existing traders who use violence to enforce contracts and
produce products of unknown quality. He thus advocates the nationalization of the
industry so as to greatly reduce prices thereby eliminating the criminal element from
the market. This would also, according to the author, “…discourage any legitimate
firm from diversifying into this area. On the other hand the government could control
the quality of drugs sold, regulate the age requirements for sale and easily implement
education and rehabilitation programs” (p.80).
Clearly then, public policy towards the trade in and consumption of drugs such
as narcotics is a difficult and contentious issue in most countries. On the one hand
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few would advocate complete decriminalisation and a free market approach as this
would likely result in a much larger cohort of addicts with associated social costs. On
the other hand the current approach of a continuously tougher prohibition and law
enforcement regime also appears to be very costly. Our paper seeks to make a
contribution to this debate by constructing a dynamic macroeconomic model where
government seeks to maximise the value of output in the presence of productive nonusing workers and less productive drug users. Drug use is modelled as a diffusion
process with user numbers being increasing in the existing user population but
decreasing in the costly government prevention effort. The objective of government is
to determine the prevention effort which maximises the net present value of the
nation’s human resources. The conceptual framework developed in our paper is also
applicable to the use of other substances. For instance, alcohol abuse in Russia is now
so widespread that it could be described as a social epidemic. Therefore, whilst we
refer in this paper to users of drugs such as narcotics, the approach is sufficiently
general to make it applicable to the abuse of any potentially debilitating substance.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the
building blocks of our drug-control model where the nation’s labour force is divided
into non-using and therefore fully productive workers and less productive drug users.
Section 3 presents and interprets the rule for drug-control effort that maximises the
present value of the stream of the net national incomes stemming from the country’s
using and non-using workers. The properties of the steady states of the system
comprising this rule and the drug-proliferation equation are analysed, displayed and
simulated in section 4. The effects of changes in the model parameters on the steady
state numbers of users, the steady state preventive effort, and the steady state level of
disposable national income are simulated in section 5. The model is expanded in
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section 6 to incorporate the social costs of disharmony between non-users and users.
Section 7 concludes.

2. Building blocks of an economic drug-control model
Our model focuses on the relationship between the use of narcotic drugs,
labour productivity, aggregate income and the government preventive effort. For
tractability, we ignore capital, capital accumulation and technological changes and
assume that labour is the sole factor of production. More specifically, our model is
based on the following assumptions.

Assumption 1 (labour-force size and composition): The size of the workingage population is time invariant and equal to L, of which N(t) people use narcotics,
hereafter Narcos.

Assumption 2 (drugs and employment): L g members of the labour force are
Anti Narcotic Guards and Enforcers of Law (Angels) employed by the government,
whilst the remaining L − L g members are employed in the private sector. Narcos
cannot be Angels. For tractability, the Angel force is taken to be homogeneous and
having a single activity. 1

Assumption 3 (drugs and productivity): Drug use reduces productivity. If the
instantaneous output of each of the privately employed L − N (t ) − L g non-users,
hereafter Machos, is y then the instantaneous output of a Narco is

1

A broader framework may consider multiple prevention and rehabilitation activities with diminishing
marginal returns and, in turn, the division (or allocation) of the Angel force (or time) into activity
groups (or slots). An extension of the model to two types of activities with varying degree of
popularity was attempted. In accordance with public preferences, some of the Angles were engaged in
prevention activity and the rest in rehabilitation. Public preferences were assumed to be responsive to
the change in the population share of Narcos. However, the increased level of complexity (two state
variables and two control variables) limited the analysis and reduced the overall clarity of the paper.
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y n = εy , 0 ≤ ε < 1

(1)

where, y is taken for simplicity to be a positive, time-invariant scalar, and ε is the
relative productivity of a Narco with ε = 0 indicating total incapacitation and
0 < ε < 1 partial incapacitation.
Assumption 4 (drug-proliferation): The net conversion of Machos and Angels
to Narcos is given by the difference between a concave diffusion function (F) and a
linear 2 prevention-rehabilitation function ( δLg )
N& (t ) = F ( N (t ); L) − δL g (t )

(2)

where, F ′′ < 0 indicates a diminishing marginal diffusion of the use of narcotics
within the population so that F ′ is positive up to a critical level N * and thereafter
negative, 3 and δ denotes the instantaneous marginal and average productivity of each
Angel in terms of the number of people prevented and rehabilitated from using
narcotics. Our specification of the diffusion function is based on the premise that the
use of narcotics is socially contagious -- as the number of Narcos increases drug using
becomes more socially acceptable. Due to innate intellectual, moral, cultural and
physiological differences people have different degree of resistance to drugs. Drug

2

An alternative concave specification -- R ( L g ), R ′ > 0, R ′′ < 0 -- reflecting diminishing marginal

prevention requires − λ (t ) R ′′( Lg (t )) < 2c for an interior solution to the maximisation problem
described in section 3 to exist, where c is the overhead and social cost coefficient indicated in
assumption 5 and λ is the co-state variable of the maximisation-problem’s Hamiltonian. It is also
possible that the marginal prevention depends upon the number of Narcos ( R ′( L g ; N ) ). However,
the effect of N on the marginal prevention is not clear a-priori. On the one hand, the greater the number
of Narcos the easier the “catch”. On the other hand, a larger number of Narcos might be associated
with a greater resistance to prevention.
*
3
For instance, N = 0.5(1 − β ) L in the case of a logistic diffusion function

F (t ) = αN (t )[1 − N (t ) /(1 − β ) L] , where 0 < α < 1 denotes the intrinsic diffusion rate and
0 ≤ β < 1 the share of the population absolutely unsusceptible to narcotics.
6

use spreads gradually and in diminishing increments from highly susceptible people to
less susceptible people.

Assumption 5 (prevention costs): The instantaneous cost of prevention is an
increasing and convex function of L g (t ) comprising a linear part of forgone private
output ( y for each Angel) and a quadratic part that comprises both the overhead costs
of, and the social costs stemming from, prevention. Consistent with Miron (2001) and
Kennally (2001), we assume that social costs increase rapidly in the government
prevention effort as drug traders resort to more serious forms of criminal activity and
violence and drug users face greater uncertainties about supply and drug quality. In
formal terms, the instantaneous costs of prevention are depicted as follows:

C (t ) = yL g (t ) + cL g (t ) 2

(3)

where c is the positive coefficient of the marginal overhead and social costs
associated with prevention.

Assumption 6 (balanced budget and tax neutrality): At every instance the
government fully finances the prevention effort by collecting income tax that, for
simplicity, is assumed to not adversely affect the supply of labour.

3. Growth-efficient prevention effort
Assumptions 1,2,3,5 and 6 imply that the instantaneous disposable national
income (DNI), that is the gross national income net of the government spending on
prevention and the social cost of drug-control, is given by

DNI (t ) = [ L − (1 − ε ) N (t ) − Lg (t )] y − cLg (t ) 2 .
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(4)

A growth-efficient drug-control effort is taken to be the trajectory of the number of
Angels ( L g o ) that maximises the sum of the discounted instantaneous DNIs generated
over an infinite planning horizon subject to the conversion equation of Machos and
Angels to Narcos. That is,
∞

L g o = arg max ∫ e − ρt {[ L − (1 − ε ) N (t ) − L g (t )] y − cL g (t ) 2 }dt

(5)

0

subject to the motion Eq. (2) and where ρ is a positive fixed rate of the social
planner’s time preference.
The Hamiltonian associated with this decision problem is concave in both the
control variable ( L g ) and the state variable ( N ) and hence there exists an interior
solution. Along the growth-efficient drug-control path there is an equality between the
marginal financial and social costs of Angels, e −ρt [ y + 2cLg (t )] , and the value for the
social planner of the people prevented from using drugs by an additional Angel,
− δλ (t ) , where - λ (t ) — the present-value shadow cost of Narcos — diminishes in a
rate which is equal to the sum of the marginal diffusion of drugs and the ratio of the
marginal return (MR) on Angels to the marginal costs (C′ ) of Angels:

MR( L (t ))

C ' ( L (t ))

g
647g4
8 647
48
λ&(t )
= − F ' ( N (t ); L) − δ (1 − ε ) y / ( y + 2cLg ) .
λ (t )

(6)

The evolution of the number of Angels along the growth-efficient path is given by the
no-arbitrage rule:

L& g o (t ) =

C ′( L

o

)

g
MR( L g )
8 6
6447448 644744
474
8
o
[ ρ − F ′( N (t ); L)][ y + 2cLg (t )] − δ (1 − ε ) y

UC ( L g o )

o

2{c

C ′′

8

.

(7)

(See mathematical details in Appendix A.)

The first term in the numerator of the no-arbitrage rule is the instantaneously
forgone gross national income stemming from an additional infinitesimal investment
in prevention. It is equal to the product of the user cost (UC) of the prevention capital
(namely, the fully productive people employed as Angels) and the financial and social
costs of employing an additional unit of prevention capital (Angel). The user cost of
the prevention capital (Angels) includes the government’s, or social planner’s, rate of
time preference (presumably the forgone national interest on any dollar spent on
prevention) but is reduced by the instantaneous “infection” of the Machos and Angels
labour forces generated by an additional Narco, which is positive (negative) up to
(beyond) the critical mass of N * Narcos. The second term in the numerator of Eq.
(7), δ (1 − ε ) y , indicates the marginal return on prevention capital (Angels). The
employment of an Angel increases the number of the fully productive Machos by δ
and, in turn, increases gross national income by δ (1 − ε ) y .
The no-arbitrage rule suggests that the government efficient employment of
Angels changes during the planning horizon in accordance with the difference
between the forgone gross national income stemming from an additional infinitesimal
effort invested in prevention and the return, in terms of gross national income, on an
additional unit of effort invested in this activity. If the loss of national income from
employing an additional Angle is greater (smaller) than the return on an Angle,
investment in prevention capital has to be accelerated (decelerated). The intertemporal
change in the number of Angels is moderated by the coefficient ( 2c ) of the associated
marginal overhead and social cost. By adhering to this no-arbitrage rule the
government facilitates the construction of a growth-efficient trajectory of the national
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portfolio of privately employed inputs comprising a fully effective labour force of
L − N (t ) − Lg (t ) Machos and a less effective labour force of N(t) Narcos.

4. Steady states: nature and values
By setting L& g = 0 in the no-arbitrage rule, the steady-state level of the effort
invested in prevention is
L g ss = C ′′ −1 (δ (1 − ε ) y /[ ρ − F ′( N ss ; L)])

(8)

Recalling Eq. (2), it can also be expressed as
L g ss = F ( N ss ; L) / δ .

(9)

Thus, the stationary number of Narcos satisfies the following equality
C ′′ −1 (δ (1 − ε ) y /[ ρ − F ′( N ss ; L)]) = F ( N ss ; L) / δ .

(10)

The phase-plane diagram presented below is constructed for the case where
the planner’s rate of time preference ( ρ ) is larger than the intrinsic proliferation rate
of drugs ( F ′(0; L) ) – the only case shown by numerical simulations to have
(computable) steady states with our choice of an explicit drug-diffusion function. (See
appendix B for a detailed and complete phase-plane analysis.) In this case, as well as
in the case of

ρ < F ′(0; L) , the steady states are asymptotically unstable.

Nevertheless, two arms converge to the low-prevention saddle point, SS 2 , from westnorth-west and from east-south-east, as displayed in Figure 1. The high-prevention
steady state, SS1 , is an asymptotically unstable spiral. That is, if initially the system is
off that steady state, diverging oscillations in both the number of Narcos and the
number of Angels characterise the path maximising the sum of the discounted
disposable national incomes. These oscillations reveal periods of high preventative
effort leading eventually to a decline in number of Narcos, followed by periods of
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reduced effort subsequently leading to a rise in the number of Narcos. The directions
of the efficient, diverging trajectories stemming from possible initial points in the
vicinity of SS1 and SS 2 are indicated by horizontal and vertical arrows.

Figure 1: Phase-plane diagram with ρ > F ' (0, L)

To facilitate our numerical simulations, the drug-diffusion function ( F ) is set
to be logistic:

F (t ) = αN (t )[1 −

N (t )
]
(1 − β ) L

(11)

where 0 < α < 1 indicates the intrinsic proliferation rate of narcotics within the
population and 0 ≤ β < 1 the share of the population resistant to narcotic use. In this
case, the aforementioned no-arbitrage rule and the state-equation are displayed by the
following system of non-linear differential equations
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L& g (t ) = {{ρ − α [1 − 2 N (t ) /(1 − β ) L(t )]}[( y + 2cL g (t )] − δ (1 − ε ) y} / 2c

(12)

N& (t ) = αN (t )[1 − N (t ) /(1 − β ) L(t )] − δLg (t ).

(13)

We substitute the steady-state condition L& g = 0 = N& into this system and solve to
obtain the following stationary values:




1
δ (1 − ε ) y

L g ss =
− y
2αN ss
2c 

 ρ − α + (1 − β ) L




(14)

where N ss satisfies the following polynomial
2α
N ss3 + ( ρ − 3α ) N ss 2 − [(δ y / c ) + ( ρ − α )(1 − β ) L] N ss = δ [ ρ − α − δ (1 − ε )] y (1 − β ) L / 2cα
(1 − β ) L

.(15)
Consequently, the stationary level of gross national income ( GNI ss ) is given by
GNI ss = [ L − (1 − ε ) N ss ] y

(16)

whilst the stationary disposable national income ( DNI ss ) is given by
DNI ss = [ L − (1 − ε ) N ss − L g ss ] y − cLg ss

2

.

(17)

As mentioned earlier, our numerical simulations reveal that steady states can
be computed only for the case where the rate of time preference is larger than the
intrinsic diffusion rate of drugs ( ρ > α ). The numerically computed numbers of
Angels and Narcos and the level of disposable net income in the steady states SS1 and
SS 2 are reported in Table 1 for an imaginary country with the following
chatcteristics:
a labour force (L) of 10,000,000,
the relative productivity of a Narco ( ε ) being 0.5,
an income of $22,500 per annum per Macho,
12

an intrinsic drug-proliferation rate (α ) of 0.02 per annum,
one half of the labour force with absolute resistance to drug use
( β = 0.5 ),
a productivity per Angel (δ ) of 12 prevented people per annum,
a marginal overhead and social-cost coefficient (c) of $1,500 per
annum, and
an annual social rate of time preference ( ρ ) of 0.04.

Table 1: High and low prevention effort steady states
High-effort
Low-effort
steady state ( SS1 ) steady state ( SS 2 )
1515
800
L ss
g

N ss

1,194,350

4,461,770

DNI ss

$208,090,000,000 $173,830,000,000

As mentioned above, SS1 (SS2) is the steady state with a relatively high (low)
government preventative effort and hence a relatively low (high) number of users. If
maximising disposable national income is the objective then the high prevention
regime at SS1 is clearly preferable to the low prevention regime at SS2. The much
greater cost of the preventative effort at SS1, with the number of Angels being almost
twice that at SS2, is more than compensated for by the reduced user numbers and
hence the greater aggregate labour force productivity. Of course shocks to the system
(see analysis below), such as changes to the labour force (L) or a change in social
attitudes to drug use that reduces the resistance of some to drug use (β), mean that the
economy is likely to be off steady state most of the time. Beginning at SS1 we again
note that the economy will follow a diverging spiral path that, depending on the speed
of adjustment, implies policy oscillations from periods of higher preventative effort to
period of lower preventative effort.
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5. The effects of changes in the model parameters
Plausible changes in the parameters of the model, such as an increased labour
force or an increased overhead and social cost of drug use, will affect the steady state
numbers of Angels and Narcos and the steady state level of DNI and may also affect
the trajectory from a steady state given some perturbation to the system. The
directions of these changes cannot be assessed by total differentiation (see Appendix
C for details). However, the number of Angels and Narcos can be determined by
evaluating the direction of the shifts of the isoclines L& g = 0 and N& = 0 . Table 2
summarises the impact of an increase in each parameter in turn on the isoclines and
thus on the steady state numbers of Angels and Narcos.

Table 2: The directions of the effects of increased parameter values
ρ
y
α
c
δ
β
Parameters →
L
down up
down down down up
Isocline L& g = 0 up
Isocline N& = 0
Lg ss1

up
up

--down up
down up
up

N ss1

up

down up

down up

down up

down

Lg ss 2

down down up

down up

down up

down

N ss 2

up

up

down up

down ----down down up

ε
down

down up

--down

down up

The direction of the isocline shifts alone, however, cannot reveal the direction
and size of the impact on the stationary level of disposable national income. Hence
numerical simulations based on the initial parameter set were used to assess the
percentage change in the stationary number of Angels and Narcos and on the
stationary level of DNI induced by a one percent increase in each of the parameters in
turn. Recalling Eq. (17), the elasticities of DNI with respect to the model parameters
are given by
ξ DNI = −[( y + 2cL g ss )ξ L g L g ss + (1 − ε ) yξ N N ss ] / DNI ss
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(18)

where

ξ L g ≡ (∆L g / L g ) /(∆γ / γ )

ξ N ≡ (∆N / N ss ) /(∆γ / γ )

and

denote

the

elasticities of the number of Angels and Narcos, respectively, with respect to any of
the model parameters (denoted by γ ). The simulated elasticities of the stationary
numbers of Angels and Narcos and of the stationary level of DNI with respect to the
model parameters are reported in Table 3 for SS1 and in Table 4 for SS 2 .

Table 3: The elasticities of the numbers of Angels and Narcos and of DNI at SS1
ρ
y
α
c
ε
δ
Parameters → L
β
Elasticities
↓
0.297 -0.878 0.290 0.581 -0.350 -0.640 0.654 -0.706
ξL
g

ξN

0.018

ξ DNI

-0.011 0.108

-1.217 2.133

-0.542 0.0003 -0.893 0.999

-0.147 0.016

0.012

0.079

-0.986

-0.086 0.087

Table 4: The elasticities of the numbers of Angels and Narcos and of DNI at SS 2
ρ
y
α
c
ε
δ
β
Parameters → L
Elasticities
↓
-0.075 -0.725 1.263 -0.388 0.125 -0.988 1.113 -1.088
ξL
g

ξN

1.147

ξ DNI

-0.330 -0.021 0.084

0.099

-0.340 0.170

-1.156 0.133

-0.045 0.332

-0.155 0.148

-0.027 0.032

-0.031

As the steady states are not asymptotically stable, the direction and size of the changes
imposed by the model parameters on the model endogenous variables reported in
Tables 2-4 should not be interpreted as the parameters’ impact effects, but as the
changes required for a new steady state to prevail.
Table 3 reveals that in the vicinity of the high-preventative-effort steady state
the highest growth rate, though modest, is generated by a rise in the rate of time
preference ( ρ ). This is due to the substantial negative impact of such a change on
both the number of Angels and the number of Narcos in a new steady state. The
underlying rationale is as follows. The higher the social planner’s rate of time
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preference the lower his, or her, inclination to recruit/employ Angles, who can be
Machos in current private production activity. This, in turn, leads to an increase in the
number of Narcos and to diverging oscillations. Steady state can only be retained with
a smaller number of Narcos than the initial number. In contrast, a rise in the
prevention-recovery rate (δ ) leads to the largest decline rate in DNI due, in
particular, to the considerable increase in the number of Narcos required for retaining
a steady state. It is also interesting to note that in the vicinity of the high-effort steady
state a rise in full-capacity (Macho’s) income increases the control effort substantially
but at the same time also generates almost one percent rise in the number of Narcos
and hence a slight decline in DNI. Opposite outcomes are generated by a rise in either
the Narcos’ degree of productivity or the cost-coefficient.

Table 4 displays a markedly different parameter effects in the vicinity of the
low-preventative-effort steady state. The highest growth rate, three times larger than
the counterpart in the vicinity of the high-effort steady state, is generated by an
increase in the share of the population absolutely unsusceptible to drugs. This is due
to the large decline in the population of Narcos which more than compensating for the
extra costs of drug-control associated with the increased effort. An equally large but
opposite results are generated by an increase in the labour-force size. It is interesting
to note that a rise in either the recovery rate or full-capacity income leads to a large
increase in drug-control effort, but the decline in the number of Narcos is small and
does not compensate for the rise in the costs of the drug-control effort and hence
generate a slight decline in DNI. In contrast, a one per cent rise in the control-cost
coefficient reduces the drug-control effort by a similar per cent without causing a
large increase in the number of Narcos (as the control effort has already been low)
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and as the net cost saving exceeds the extra loss of production capacity, the DNI of a
new steady should be slightly larger.

We note from these results that changes in two parameter values have
unambiguous impacts on the stationary level of disposable net income. Firstly,
population (or more correctly, labour force) growth (L) is unambiguously bad for DNI
with the positive effect on the number of Narcos being much greater in SS2 than in
SS1. Similarly, an increase in the proportion of the population totally resistant to drug
use (β) is unambiguously good for DNI with the negative impact on the number of
Narcos being much greater in SS2 than in SS1. This result may be interpreted as
support for government interventions such as public education campaigns that warn of
the dangers of drug use and thus reduce the propensity of some to experiment with
drugs.

6. Extension - societal disharmony
If substance abuse is sufficiently widespread, tensions between users and nonusers might arise. 4 It is possible that the level of societal disharmony intensifies, and
hence social costs increase, as the difference between the number of Machos and
Angels and the number of Narcos diminishes.

Assumption 7: The relationship between costs of societal disharmony (CSDH)
and the share of the population that are Narcos conforms to an inverted U-shaped
curve:

CSDH (t ) = CSDH max − µ [( N (t ) / L) − 0.5] 2

4

(19)

In the case of AIDS, there exists tension between infected and non-infected people and incidence of
atrocities have taken place.
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where CSDH max is the maximum societal cost of disharmony that accrues when the
number of users is equal to the number of non-users, and µ is a positive scalar
reflecting the moderation of the cost of societal disharmony by the quadratic distance
from equal number.

Assumption 7 implies, in conjunction with the assumptions made earlier, that
the instantaneous DNI, now the gross national income net of the financial and social
costs of prevention and the costs of societal disharmony, is given by

DNI (t ) = [ L − (1 − ε ) N (t ) − Lg (t )] y − cLg (t ) 2 − [CSDH max − µ (( N (t ) / L) − 0.5) 2 ] .
(20)
Consequently, the efficient number of Angels is now
∞

Lˆ g = arg max ∫ e − ρt {[ L − (1 − ε ) N (t ) − L g (t )] y − cL g (t ) 2 − [ SDH max − µ (( N (t ) / L) − 0.5) 2 ]}dt
0

(21)
subject to the motion Eq. (2).
The no-arbitrage rule associated with this modification is
[ ρ − F ′( N (t ); L)][ y + 2cLˆ g (t )] − δ {(1 − ε ) y + (2µ / L)[( N (t ) / L) − 0.5]}
&
Lˆ g (t ) =
. (22)
2c
(See details in Appendix D.)
Since an extra infinitesimal effort in reducing the number of Narcos does not
N (t ) >
& <
= 0.5 . If the
necessarily reduce the level of societal disharmony, Lˆ g = L& g o as
L <
>
number of drug users initially exceeds the number of non-users, a rise in the
preventative effort reduces the groups’ size-differential and thereby intensifies the
social tension. In this case, a smaller rise in preventative effort is recommended by a
socially aware planner than by a planner ignoring social disharmony. Conversely, if
the number of non-users initially exceeds the number of drug-users, a rise in the
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preventative effort increases the groups’ size-differential and hence reduces the level
of social tension. In this case, a larger rise in preventative effort is advocated by a
socially aware planner than by a planner disregarding social disharmony.

7. Conclusion
Drug use is in many countries a social epidemic that reduces the number of
fully productive workers and thereby aggregate output. This paper presented a socialepidemic-control model — a hybrid of an epidemiological diffusion process and
economic (and to a lesser extent, social) objectives — with a special reference to
narcotics. The model is generic and may also be applicable to other epidemics such as
alcohol abuse and AIDS.
The model divided the labour force into fully productive workers who do not
use drugs and only partially productive users, and assumed that the use of drugs is
socially contagious. In addition to forgone private output, costs are borne by
government and society with the provision of a preventative effort. Efficient
management of the nation’s portfolio of human resources was perceived as embarking
on a path of drug-control effort that maximises the present value of the stream of the
disposable national incomes. The efficient level of prevention varies during the
planning horizon in accordance with the difference between the forgone gross national
income stemming from an additional infinitesimal effort invested in this activity and
the return, in terms of gross national income, on an additional unit of effort invested in
this activity. The intertemporal change in the preventative effort is moderated by the
coefficient of the associated marginal overhead and social costs. The forgone national
income was taken as the product of the user cost of the typical non-user employed by
the government and the marginal financial and social costs of the invested
preventative effort. The user cost of a publicly employed Angel rises with the
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government rate of time preference but is moderated by the instantaneous marginal
“infection” of the labour force by drug users. The possible steady states of the system
comprising this rule and the drug-proliferation equation were found to be
asymptotically unstable and were numerically simulated. The effects of the model
parameters on the long-run equilibrium numbers of Narcos and Angels and
subsequently on the long-run equilibrium disposable national income were simulated.
Finally, the economic drug-control model was expanded to incorporate tension
between users and non-users.
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Appendix A: The necessary and sufficient conditions and the no-arbitrage rule
The (present value) Hamiltonian associated with Eq. (5) and Eq. (2) is
H (t ) = e − ρt {[ L − (1 − ε ) N (t ) − L g (t )] y − cL g (t ) 2 } + λ (t )[ F ( N (t ); L) − δL g (t )] .
(A1)
The necessary and sufficient conditions for maximum are:
∂H (t )
λ&(t ) = −
= e − ρt [(1 − ε ) y ] − λ (t ) F ′( N (t ); L)
∂N (t )
∂H (t )
= −e − ρt [ y + 2cL g (t )] − δλ (t ) = 0
∂L g (t )

(A2)
(A3)

Eq. (2) and the transversality condition lim λ (t ) N (t ) = 0 .
t →∞

Eq. (6) is obtained by dividing both sides of Eq. (A2) by λ and considering that by
virtue of Eq. (A3) λ (t ) = −e ρt [ y + 2cL g (t )] / δ . The no-arbitrage rule, Eq. (7), is

obtained by differentiating the optimality condition (A3) with respect to t (singular
control), substituting the information contained in conditions (A2) and (A3) for λ& and
λ , respectively, multiplying both sides by e ρt / 2c and rearranging terms. It can also
be obtained by using Euler equation.
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Appendix B: Phase-plane analysis
The system comprising the no-arbitrage rule (Eq. (7)) and the net-loss of fully
productive workers (Eq. (2)) has multiple steady states. The number and nature of
these steady states is identified by the following phase-plane analysis.
<
 F ′( N ; L)  >
0
as
N
N * and
=
=
=

&
dN N = 0  δ
>
<
hence this isocline is displayed by an inverted U-shaped curve in the phase plane.
dN&
= −δ < 0 , N& is negative (positive) and depicted by leftward (rightward)
Since
dLg

The slope of the isocline N& = 0 is

dL g

pointed horizontal arrows, in the region above (below) this isocline.
 F ′′( N ; L)C ′(t )  >
=
=0
dN L& g = 0  [ ρ − F ′( N ; L)]C ′′(t )  <
>
<
>
dL g
= 0 for N = F ′′ −1 ( ρ ) where
as F ′( N ; L) = ρ , which in turn implies that
dN L& g = 0 <
<
>
The slope of the isocline L& g = 0 is

dL g

F ′′ −1 ( ρ ) < N * .
If the government’s rate of time preference ( ρ ) exceeds the intrinsic diffusion
rate ( F ′(0; L) ) the isocline L& g = 0 is negatively sloped in the entire phase plane.
There are two asymptotically unstable steady states and the system’s dynamics is
displayed in Figure 1.
If the intrinsic diffusion rate of narcotics exceeds the government’s rate of
time preference the isocline L& g = 0 also has an inverted U-shape as displayed by
Figure 2 or Figure 3. Also in this case the stationary points are asymptotically
unstable. Figure 3 demonstrates three steady states with a convergent arm to SS 5 .
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Figure 2: Phase-plane diagram with ρ < F ' (0, L)

Figure 3: Phase-plane diagram with ρ < F ' (0, L)
For further identification of the nature of the steady states, the eigenvalues of
the state-transition matrix (a) of the linearised (in the vicinity of steady state) system
comprising the no-arbitrage rule (Eq. (7)) and the state equation (Eq. (2)) are
computed as follows:

23





2
µ1,2 = 0.5 ρ ± ρ − 4{[ ρ − F ′( N ss )]F ′( N ss ) − δF ′′( N ss )C ′(t )}  .
14444444244444443


det( a)



(B1)

Recalling that F ′′ < 0 and C ′ > 0 , the second term in det(a ) is positive (namely,
− δF ′′( N ss )C ′(t ) > 0 ) for all of the steady states illustrated above. In the cases of SS1 ,
SS 2 , SS 4 , SS 6 , and SS 7 , ρ > F ′( N ss ) because N ss > N * . In the case of SS1 ,
F ′ > 0 and hence the first term in det(a ) is positive. In this case, det(a) > 0 and
hence SS1 is not a saddle point. In the cases of SS 2 , SS 4 , SS 6 , and SS 7 , F ′ < 0 and
hence the first term in det(a ) is negative. In the cases of SS 3 and SS 5 , the sign of
ρ − F ′( N ss ) and consequently the sign of the first term in det(a ) are not clear.
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Appendix C: The effects of changes in the model parameters
The effects of changes in L, ρ , δ ,α , β , c, y , and ε on N ss are obtained by
differentiating Eq. (17):
2αN ss 3

+ ( ρ − α )(1 − β ) N ss +

dN ss (1 − β ) L2
=
dL
6αN ss 2

(1 − β ) L

δ [ ρ − α − δ (1 − ε )] y (1 − β )
2cα

(C1)

+ 2( ρ − 3α ) N ss − (δy / c) − ( ρ − α )(1 − β ) L

dN ss
(1 − β ) L[ N ss + δy / 2cα ] − N ss 2
=
dρ
6αN ss 2
+ 2( ρ − 3α ) N ss − (δy / c ) − ( ρ − α )(1 − β ) L
(1 − β ) L
[ yN ss + ( ρ − α − 2δ )(1 − β ) L / 2α ] / c
dN ss
=
2
dδ
6αN ss
+ 2( ρ − 3α ) N ss − (δy / c ) − ( ρ − α )(1 − β ) L
(1 − β ) L

(C2)

(C3)

dN ss 3N ss 2 − {[2 N ss 3 /(1 − β ) L] + (1 − β ) L[ N ss + δ (1 − β ) L( yα − (( ρ − α − δ (1 − ε )) y ) / 2cα 2 ]}
=
dα
6αN ss 2
+ 2( ρ − 3α ) N ss − (δy / c) − ( ρ − α )(1 − β ) L
(1 − β ) L
(C4)
 2αN ss 3
δL{[ ρ − α − δ (1 − ε )] y} 
−
+ ( ρ − α ) LN ss +

 (1 − β ) 2 L
2cα
dN ss


=
2
dβ
6αN ss
+ 2( ρ − 3α ) N ss − (δy / c) − ( ρ − α )(1 − β ) L
(1 − β ) L
dN ss
− δ [ yN ss + ( ρ − α − δ (1 − ε )) y (1 − β ) L / 2α ] / c 2
=
dc
6αN ss 2
+ 2( ρ − 3α ) N ss − (δy / c ) − ( ρ − α )(1 − β ) L
(1 − β ) L
dN ss
(δ / c ){N ss + [ ρ − α − δ (1 − ε )](1 − β ) L / 2α }
=
dy
6αN ss 2
+ 2( ρ − 3α ) N ss − (δy / c ) − ( ρ − α )(1 − β ) L
(1 − β ) L

25

(C5)

(C6)

(C7)

dN ss
− δ 2 y (1 − β ) L / 2cα
=
.
d (1 − ε ) 6αN ss 2
+ 2( ρ − 3α ) N ss − (δy / c) − ( ρ − α )(1 − β ) L
(1 − β ) L
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(C8)

Appendix D: The no-arbitrage rule of Eq. (22)
The Hamiltonian associated with this decision problem is:
H (t ) = e− ρt {[ L − (1 − ε ) N (t )] y − C ( Lg (t )) − [CSDH max − µ (( N (t ) / L) − 0.5) 2 ]} + λ (t )[ F ( N (t ); L) − δLg (t )] .(D1)

Since H is concave in both the control variable and the state variable there exists an
interior solution. The necessary conditions for maximum are
∂H (t )
λ&(t ) = −
= e − ρt {(1 − ε ) y + (2 µ / L)[(( N (t )) / L) − 0.5]} − λ (t ) F ′( N (t ); L)
∂N (t )

(D2)

∂H (t )
= −e − ρt C ′( L g (t )) − δλ (t ) = 0
∂L g (t )

(D3)

Eq. (2) and the transversality condition lim λ (t ) N (t ) = 0 .
t →∞

The no-arbitrage rule, Eq. (22), is obtained by differentiating the optimality condition
(D3) with respect to t (singular control), substituting the information contained in
conditions (D2) and (D3) for λ& and λ , respectively, multiplying both sides by
e ρt / C ′′( Lg (t )) and rearranging terms.
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